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Abstract
Skeletal motion plays a vital role in human activity
recognition as either an independent data source or a com-
plement [33]. The robustness of skeleton-based activity
recognizers has been questioned recently [29, 50], which
shows that they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks when
the full-knowledge of the recognizer is accessible to the at-
tacker. However, this white-box requirement is overly re-
strictive in most scenarios and the attack is not truly threat-
ening. In this paper, we show that such threats do exist
under black-box settings too. To this end, we propose the
first black-box adversarial attack method BASAR. Through
BASAR, we show that adversarial attack is not only truly
a threat but also can be extremely deceitful, because on-
manifold adversarial samples are rather common in skele-
tal motions, in contrast to the common belief that adver-
sarial samples only exist off-manifold [18]. Through ex-
haustive evaluation and comparison, we show that BASAR
can deliver successful attacks across models, data, and at-
tack modes. Through harsh perceptual studies, we show
that it achieves effective yet imperceptible attacks. By an-
alyzing the attack on different activity recognizers, BASAR
helps identify the potential causes of their vulnerability and
provides insights on what classifiers are likely to be more
robust against attack.
1. Introduction
Deep learning methods have been proven to be vulnera-
ble to carefully devised data perturbations since first identi-
fied in [45]. This causes major concerns especially in safety
and security [1], as the perturbations are imperceptible to
humans but destructive to machine intelligence. Conse-
quently, how to detect and defend attacks has also been in-
vestigated [6]. While the attack on static data (e.g. images,
texts, graphs) has been widely studied, the attack on time-
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series data has only been recently explored [23, 16]. In this
paper, we look into a specific yet important type of time
series data, skeletal motions, under adversarial attack.
Skeletal motion is crucial in activity recognition as it in-
creases the robustness by mitigating issues such as lighting,
occlusion, view angles, etc [37]. Therefore, the vulnera-
bility of skeleton-based classifiers under adversarial attack
has recently drawn attention [29, 61, 50]. Albeit identify-
ing a key issue that needs to be addressed, their methods are
essentially white-box methods. The attempt on black-box
attack is via surrogate models, i.e. attack a classifier in a
white-box manner then use the results to attack the target
classifier. While white-box attack requires the full knowl-
edge of the attacked model which is unlikely to be available
in real-world scenarios, black-box attack via surrogate mod-
els cannot guarantee success due to its heavy dependence
on the choice of the surrogate model [51]. In this paper, we
propose BASAR, the very first black-box attack method on
skeletal action recognition to our best knowledge.
A skeletal motion has unique features that distinguish
itself from other data under adversarial attack. First, a
skeleton usually has less than 100 Degrees of freedom
(Dofs), much smaller than previously attacked data such
as images/meshes. This low dimensionality leads to low-
redundancy [46], restricting possible attacks within small
subspaces. Second, imperceptibility is a prerequisite for any
successful attack, but its evaluation on skeletal motions is
under-explored. Different from the attack where visual im-
perceptibility has high correlations mainly with the pertur-
bation magnitude (e.g. images), a skeletal motion has dy-
namics that are well-recognized by human perceptual sys-
tems. More specifically, any sparse attack, e.g. on individ-
ual joints or individual frames, albeit small would break the
dynamics and therefore be easily perceptible. In contrast,
coordinated attacks on all joints and frames can provide bet-
ter imperceptibility even when perturbations are relatively
large [50]. As a result, using the perturbation magnitude
alone (as in most existing methods) is not a reliable metric
for skeletal motion. Last but not least, prior methods mainly
assume that adversarial samples are off the data manifold
[18]. As we will show, skeletal motion is one real-world ex-
ample where on-manifold adversarial samples not only ex-
ist but are rather common. This raises a serious concern for
human activity recognition solutions as these on-manifold
adversarial samples are implementable.
Given a motion x with class label Cx, BASAR aims
to find x′ that is close to x (measured by some distance
function) and can fool the black-boxed classifier such that
Cx′ 6= Cx. BASAR formulates it as a constrained optimiza-
tion problem, aiming to find x′ that is just outside Cx while
still on the data manifold. The optimization is highly non-
linear due to the complexity of the classification boundaries
and the data manifold. The former dictates that any greedy
search (e.g. gradient-based) near the boundaries will suffer
from local minima; while the latter means that not all pertur-
bation directions result in equal visual quality (in-manifold
perturbation tends to be better than off-manifold perturba-
tion). Consequently, there are often conflicts between these
two spaces when searching for x′. To reconcile the con-
flicts, we propose a method called guided manifold walk
(GMW). GMW consists of three sub-routines: aimed prob-
ing, random exploration, and manifold projection. It starts
from a random position (untargeted attack) outside Cx, or a
random sample within a specific class (targeted attack with
the specific class as the targeted class). It then can approach
x by aimed probing attempting to find a sample which is
close to the boundary of Cx, or by random explorations to
overcome local minima to find samples that are closer to x,
or by manifold projection to find the closest point on the
data manifold. The above sub-routines are iteratively exe-
cuted driven by the quality of the adversarial sample until
a satisfactory x′ is found or the maximum number of itera-
tions is reached.
We extensively evaluate BASAR on several state-of-the-
art methods using multiple datasets in both untargeted and
targeted attack tasks. The results show that not only is
BASAR successful across models and datasets, it can also
find on-manifold adversarial samples, in contrast to the
common assumption that adversarial samples only exist off-
manifold [18]. On par with very recent work that also
found on-manifold samples in images [43], we show, for
the first time, the existence and commonality of such sam-
ples in skeletal motions. We also comprehensively com-
pare BASAR with other methods, showing the superiority
of BASAR by large margins. Finally, since the perturbation
magnitude alone is not enough to evaluate the attack quality,
we conduct harsh perceptual studies to evaluate the natural-
ness, deceitfulness, and indistinguishability of the attack.
Formally, we demonstrate that adversarial attack is truly
a threat to skeleton-based activity recognition. To this end,
we propose the first black-box attack method and compre-
hensively evaluate the vulnerability of several state-of-the-
art activity recognition methods. We show the existence of
on-manifold adversarial samples in various skeletal motion
datasets and provide key insights on what classifiers tend to
resist on-manifold adversarial samples.
2. Related Work
2.1. Skeleton-based Activity Recognition
Early research has well explored a variety of hand-
crafted features [48, 17, 13] to recognize human actions
from skeletal motions. Benefiting from the ability of neu-
ral networks, recent deep learning based methods have
achieved state-of-the-art performance. Among them, RNN-
based methods treat the motion data as a time series of joint
coordinates, and employ common RNN architectures such
as LSTMs to conduct the motion classification [15, 30, 41,
57]. CNN-based methods try to utilize image classifica-
tion methods to recognize the motion data [31, 25, 42]. To
this end, they transform the motion data into 2D pseudo-
images, where each column stores a frame of skeleton joint
coordinates. Graph convolutional network (GCN) based
methods consider the skeleton as a topological graph where
the nodes correspond to joints and edges correspond to the
bones connecting neighboring joints. They perform con-
volution operations on graphs to effectively recognize the
actions [56, 28, 40, 39, 10, 60]. For example, to capture
long-range joint relations, Liu et al. [32] utilize disentan-
gled multi-scale graph convolutions, which contains a uni-
fied spatial-temporal GCN operator for capturing complex
spatial-temporal dependencies. Zhang et al. [58] introduce
joint semantics to the GCN model, resulting in a lightweight
yet effective method.
Our work is complementary to existing research by ex-
ploring their vulnerability to adversarial attacks and sug-
gesting potential improvements. Based on the codes shared
by the authors, we extensively evaluated BASAR on several
state-of-the-art methods, demonstrating that even the latest




A large variety of adversarial attack methods have been ex-
plored in different tasks [1, 44, 59]. Most of them consider
the white-box setting, where the full-knowledge of the clas-
sifier is known by the attacker. Apart from common vision-
based tasks such as classification [19, 26, 5], adversarial at-
tacks on time series and action recognition have attracted at-
tention recently. For general time series, multivariate time-
series attack has been conducted [29, 20] based on adversar-
ial transformation networks (ATN) [2]. Untargeted attack
is proposed for optical flow based action recognition [22].
For skeletal action recognition, a one-step and an iterative
method are proposed [29] based on FGSM and PGD [26]
respectively to attack GNN-based models. Wang et al. [50]
achieve better attacking results using a novel perceptual loss
that minimizes the dynamics difference between the origi-
nal and the adversarial motion. Moreover, the performance
is proven by extensive perceptual studies. Zheng et al.
[61] formulate adversarial attack as an optimization prob-
lem with joint angle constraints in the Euclidean space, then
solve it with Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers.
Although white-box attacks achieve satisfactory perfor-
mance based on the full access to the attacked models, they
are not very applicable in real-world scenarios since the de-
tails of classifiers are not usually exposed to the attacker.
Hence, it is unclear whether the classifier vulnerability un-
der (white-box) adversarial attack is a real threat. We on
the other hand show that black-box attack is possible and is
more threatening.
2.2.2 Black-box Attack
The difficulty of applying white-box attack in the real-world
motivates the study of black-box attack, in which the at-
tackers cannot access any underlying information of the at-
tacked model but only make queries. A simple approach is
transfer-based attack, which generates adversarial samples
from one surrogate model via white-box attack [36, 35]. Ex-
isting black-box methods on skeletal motion [29, 50, 61] all
rely on such a method, and cannot guarantee success due to
the heavy dependence on the surrogate model [50]. Another
type of methods is to use the predicted scores or soft labels
(e.g. the softmax layer output) for attack [8, 47]. However,
this is not exactly a black-box setting since the attacker can
still access the model.
In a truly black-box setting, only the final class labels
(hard-labels) can be used. Brendel et al. [3] perform the
first hard-label attack by a random walk along the decision
boundary. Optimization-based approaches select the search
direction by estimating the gradient using the information
computed at the decision boundary [7, 12, 11]. Dong et
al. [14] model the local geometry of the search directions
through an evolutionary attack algorithm. Li et al. [27]
explore the subspace optimization methods from three dif-
ferent representative subspaces including spatial, frequency,
and intrinsic component.
Hard-label black-box attack on time-series data is much
less explored. In the black-box setting in [20, 23], to repli-
cate/approximate the target model, the authors train a local
substitute student network to mimic the final decision of the
teacher classifier, to attack general time series. To attack
videos, Wei et al. [55] heuristically attack the key frames
and regions based on [12] due to the high dimensionality.
To our best knowledge, there is no prior work on hard-label
black-box attack on skeletal activity recognition.
Figure 1. 2D illustration of BASAR on a single frame. x is the at-
tacked frame. x′ is the ideal adversarial sample. M (black line) is
the natural pose manifold and ∂Cx (blue line) is the class bound-
ary of Cx. x′1 is the result of last iteration. x′2, x′3 and x′4 are the
three intermediate results of the current iteration.
3. Methodology
We denote a motion with n frames as x = {x1, . . . , xn},
each frame xt = {q1, . . . , qm} including m Dofs. These
Dofs are usually joint positions or angles, depending on
the data. Existing action recognizers take motions as in-
put and output a class label. Specifically, given a trained
recognizer G, G maps a motion to a probabilistic distribu-
tion over classes, G: x → Rk where k is the total number
of action classes. The class label Cx then can be derived
e.g. via softmax. To find an adversarial sample x′ of motion
x, we start with the formulation in [5] but augment it for
modeling motions:
minimize L(x,x′)
subject to Cx′ = c and x′ ∈ [0, 1]m×n, (1)
where L is the Euclidean distance. c is the targeted class.
Note that the constraint can also be replaced by Cx′ 6= Cx
for untargeted attack. However, simply applying this formu-
lation to skeletal motions is not sufficient because it only re-
stricts the adversarial sample x′ in a hyper-cube [0, 1]m×n.
Given that human poses lie in a natural pose manifold M
[53, 54], x′ can easily contain off-manifold frames which
are unnatural/implausible poses and easily perceptible. We
therefore add another constraint x′ ∈M:
minimize L(x,x′)
subject to x′ ∈ [0, 1]m×n,x′ ∈M
Cx′ = c (targeted) or Cx′ 6= Cx (untargeted). (2)
In practice, we find that x′ ∈ [0, 1]m×n is less restrictive
than other constraints and always satisfied. Eq. 2 is highly
nonlinear and cannot be solved analytically. It thus requires
a numerical solution.
3.1. Guided Manifold Walk
We propose a new method called Guided Manifold Walk
(GMW) to solve Eq. 2. For simplicity, we start with a sin-
gle frame x and a 2D illustration of GMW on x shown in
Fig. 1, where x′ is the ideal adversarial sample which is on-
manifold and close to x. Given the non-linearity of the clas-
sification boundary and the data manifold, BASAR aims
to exploit the properties of both simultaneously, inspired
by decision-boundary-based attack [3]. In each iteration,
BASAR conducts three sub-routines: random exploration,
aimed probing, and manifold projection. Random explo-
ration is to explore the vicinity of the current adversarial
sample x′1 to find a random sample x
′
2. Aimed probing is
to find a sample x′3 in proximity to ∂Cx and is closer to x,
in the direction from x′2 to x. Finally, manifold projection
is to project x′3 onto M to obtain x′4. Although GMW is
only explained for a single frame x, it can be applied to a
motion x. The algorithm overview for perturbing the whole
motion is given in Alg. 1, where λ and β are parameters and
l is a distance function. They are defined in Eq. 3, 4 and 7
respectively. Next, we give details of random exploration,
aimed probing, and manifold projection.
3.2. Random Exploration
We first extend the image-based random exploration in
[3] to motions with dynamic weighting. Random explo-
ration is an operation to explore in proximity to the classifi-
cation boundary, by making a small step towards a random
direction. The random perturbation is calculated by Eq. 3:
x̃ = x′ + W∆,







‖x∗ − x′∗‖, r ∈ N(0, I), (3)
where x̃ is the new perturbed sample, x and x′ are the at-
tacked motion and current adversarial sample. We use joint
positions and the subscript ∗ indicates either the x, y, or z
joint coordinate. Unlike [3], the update on x′ is ∆ weighted
by W - a diagonal matrix with joint weights. This is be-
cause we observe that perturbations on different joints are
not equally effective and imperceptible, e.g. perturbation on
the spinal joints cause larger visual distortion but is less ef-
fective. We therefore weight them differently. ∆* controls
the direction and magnitude of the update, and depends on
two variables R∗ and d∗. d∗ is the directional vector from
x′ to x. R∗ is a random directional vector sampled from a
Normal distribution N(0, I) where I is an identity matrix,
I ∈ Rz×z , z = mn/3, m is the number of Dofs in one
frame and n is total frame number. This directional vector
is scaled by ‖x∗ − x′∗‖ and λ.
In Eq. 3, ∆ is orthogonal to d. The random exploration
essentially explores in the directions that are orthogonal to
the direction towards x, within the local area around x′:
x′ + W∆. This mainly aims to avoid local minima along
the ∂Cx when approaching x. If x̃ is not adversarial, we
Algorithm 1: Overview of the GMW
Input: attacked motion x; random sample x̃0,
Cx̃0 = c (targeted) or Cx̃0 6= Cx (untargeted);
maximum number of iterations K; threshold ε;
Initialization: x′0 = AimedProbing(x̃0,x),
ensuring that x′0 is adversarial;
for k = 1 to K do
repeat
x̃ = RandomExploration(x′k−1,x);
until x̃ is adversarial or λ < 10−10;
if λ ≥ 10−10 then x′k = x̃ else break;
repeat
x̃ = AimedProbing(x′k,x);
until x̃ is adversarial or β < 10−10;
if β ≥ 10−10 then x′k = x̃ else break;
x̂ = ManifoldProjection(x′k,x);
while x̂ is not adversarial do
x̂ = AimedProbing(x′k, x̂);
end
if l(x̂,x) ≥ ε then x′k = x̂ else break;
end
decrease λ and perform the random exploration again; oth-
erwise, we increase λ, then enter the next sub-routine.
3.3. Aimed Probing
We adopt Aimed probing from [3], aiming to find a new
adversarial sample between the perturbed motion and the
original, so that the new adversarial sample is closer to the
attacked motion:
x̃ = x′ + β(x− x′), (4)
where β is a forward step size. β is decreased to conduct
the aimed probing again if x̃ is not adversarial; otherwise,
we increase β, then enter the next sub-routine.
3.4. Manifold Projection
After aimed probing and random exploration, the per-
turbed motion is often off the manifold, resulting in implau-
sible and unnatural poses. We thus project them back to
the manifold. Natural pose manifold can be obtained in two
ways: explicit modeling [52] or implicit learning [53, 9].
Using implicit learning would require to train a data-driven
model then use it for projection [53], breaking BASAR into
a two-step system. Therefore we employ explicit model-
ing. Specifically, we replace the constraint x′ ∈M in Eq. 2
with hard constraints on bone lengths and joint rotations.
We also constrain the dynamics of x′ to be similar to x:
minimize L(x,x′) + wL(ẍ, ẍ′)
subject to B′i = Bi and θ
min
i ≤ θ′i ≤ θmaxi
Cx′ = c (targeted) or Cx′ 6= Cx (untargeted), (5)
where ẍ and ẍ′ are the 2nd-order derivatives of x and x′, w
is a weight. Matching the 2nd-order derivatives is proven
to be important for visual imperceptibility in adversarial at-
tack [50]. L is the Euclidean distance. Bi and B′i are the
i-th bone’s lengths of the attacked and adversarial motion
respectively. When the bone lengths change from frame to
frame in the original data, we impose the bone-length con-
straint on each frame. θ′i is the i-th joint in every frame of
x′ and subject to joint limits bounded by θmini and θ
max
i .
Eq. 5 is difficult to solve, especially to satisfy both the
bone length and joint limit constraints in the joint position
space [61]. We therefore solve Eq. 5 in two steps. First, we
solve it without any constraints by Inverse Kinematics [52]
in the joint angle space, which automatically preserves the
bone lengths. Next, Eq. 5 is solved in the joint angle space:
minimize L(θ, θ′) + wL(θ̈, θ̈′)
subject to θmini ≤ θ′i ≤ θmaxi ,
Cx′ = c (targeted) or Cx′ 6= Cx (untargeted). (6)
Note that the objective function in Eq. 6 is designed to
match the joint angles and the joint angular acceleration.
We use a primal-dual interior-point method [21, 49] to solve
Eq. 6. After solving for θ′, the joint positions of the ad-
versarial motion are computed using Forward Kinematics.
Please refer to the supplementary materials for the details of
mathematical deduction, implementation, and performance.
4. Experiments
4.1. Target Models and Datasets
We select three state-of-the-art action recognition mod-
els to attack, STGCN [56], MS-G3D [32] and SGN [58].
STGCN [56] is one of the first GCN-based methods. MS-
G3D [32] and SGN [58] are both state-of-the-art meth-
ods. The three methods are sufficiently representative.
We choose three frequently used benchmark datasets:
HDM05 [34], NTU60 [38] and Kinetics [24]. HDM05
dataset [34] has 130 action classes, 2337 sequences from 5
non-professional actors. Due to its high quality, any obvious
difference between the adversarial motion and original mo-
tion can be easily perceived, making HDM05 suitable for
our perceptual study. Since our target models are not trained
on HDM05 in the original papers, we process HDM05 fol-
lowing [15] and train the target models strictly following
the protocols in the papers, achieving 87.2%, 94.4%, 99.1%
on STGCN, MS-G3D and SGN respectively. NTU RGB+D
60 [38] includes 56568 skeleton sequences with 60 action
classes, performed by 40 subjects. Due to the large intra-
class and viewpoint variations, it is ideal for verifying the
effectiveness and generalizability of our approach. Kinet-
ics 400 [24] is a large but highly noisy human action video
dataset taken from different YouTube Videos. The skeletons
are extracted from Openpose [4], consisting of over 260000
skeleton sequences. Since SGN is not trained on it, we fol-
low [58] to preprocess Kinetics skeletons and then train the
model. Because some target models are big and making
queries to them become slow, it is impractical to attack all
motions in a dataset. So we randomly sample motions to
attack. We gradually increase the number of motions to at-
tack until all evaluation metrics (explained below) stabilize,
so that we know the attacked motions are sufficiently repre-
sentative in the dataset.
4.2. Evaluation Metrics
We employ the success rate as a major indicator for eval-
uation. In addition, to further numerically evaluate the qual-
ity of the adversarial samples, we also define evaluation
metrics between the original motion x and its adversarial
sample x′, including the averaged joint position deviation l,
the averaged joint acceleration deviation ∆a, the averaged
joint angular acceleration deviation ∆α, and the averaged



































where N is the number of adversarial samples. O and T are
the total number of joints and bones in a skeleton. n is the
number of frames in a motion. In addition, we also inves-
tigate the percentage of on-manifold (OM) adversarial mo-
tions after the attack. We regard a motion as on-manifold if
all its frames respect bone-length and joint limit constraints.
Finally, since Kinetics has missing joints from time to time,
it is impossible to attack it in the joint angle space. So we
only attack it in the joint position space. Consequently, ∆α
and OM cannot be computed on Kinetics.
4.3. Untargeted Attack
To initialize for untargeted attack, we randomly sam-
ple a motion x′ for a target motion x where Cx′ 6= Cx.
Models l↓ ∆a↓ ∆α ↓ ∆B/B↓ OM↑
STGCN MP 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.00% 99.55%No MP 0.10 0.04 0.34 0.66% 0.00%
MSG3D MP 0.76 0.12 0.49 1.78% 0.13%No MP 0.70 0.09 0.82 1.81% 0.00%
SGN MP 11.53 1.92 6.70 9.60% 60.52%No MP 7.93 2.00 14.36 39.64% 0.00%
STGCN MP 0.08 0.02 0.07 4.82% 4.68%No MP 0.10 0.02 0.09 5.57% 1.82%
MSG3D MP 0.08 0.03 0.12 8.14% 0.86%No MP 0.12 0.03 0.17 10.02% 0.57%
SGN MP 0.28 0.08 0.21 11.11% 28.95%No MP 0.30 0.10 0.42 28.00% 4.55%
STGCN MP 0.05 0.0057 n/a 2.54% n/aNo MP 0.07 0.0062 n/a 3.53% n/a
MSG3D MP 0.10 0.011 n/a 5.16% n/aNo MP 0.10 0.012 n/a 5.69% n/a
SGN MP 0.12 0.020 n/a 4.23% n/aNo MP 0.13 0.022 n/a 6.93% n/a
Table 1. Untargeted attack on HDM05 (top), NTU (middle) and
Kinetics (bottom). All attacks have a 100% success rate. l: aver-
aged joint position deviation; ∆a: averaged joint acceleration de-
viation; ∆α: averaged joint angular acceleration deviation; ∆B/B:
averaged bone-length deviation percentage; on-manifold sample
percentage (OM). MP means Manifold Projection.
For HDM05, we randomly select 700 motions to attack
STGCN, MSG3D and SGN. For NTU and Kinetics, we
randomly sample 1200 and 500 motions respectively. The
maximum iterations are 500, 1000 and 2000 on HDM05,
Kinetics and NTU respectively.
The results are shown in Tab. 1. Note that BASAR
achieves 100% success in all tasks. Here we also con-
duct ablation studies (MP/No MP) to show the effects of
manifold projection. First, the universal successes across
all datasets and models demonstrate the effectiveness of
BASAR. The manifold projection directly affects the OM
results. BASAR can generate as high as 99.55% on-
manifold adversarial samples. As shown in the perceptual
study later, the on-manifold samples are very hard to be dis-
tinguished from the original motions even under very harsh
visual comparisons. Detailed confusion matrices, visual re-
sults and ablation studies can be found in the supplemen-
tary materials. We leave the performance variation analysis
across models to Section 4.5.
4.4. Targeted Attack
For targeted attack, we randomly select the same number
of motions from each dataset as in untargeted attack, with
maximum iteration set to 3000. To initiate a targeted attack
on motion x, we randomly select a motion x′ where Cx′ =
c and c is the targeted class.
The results are shown in Tab. 2. All attacks achieve
Models l↓ ∆a↓ ∆α ↓ ∆B/B↓ OM↑
STGCN MP 4.97 0.10 0.65 3.44% 56.98%No MP 6.25 0.09 0.92 5.85% 0.00%
MSG3D MP 4.34 0.12 0.71 4.51% 1.64%No MP 4.35 0.11 1.01 5.08% 0.00%
SGN MP 16.31 1.28 6.97 12.29% 20.96%No MP 16.13 1.63 13.28 29.86% 0.00%
STGCN MP 0.37 0.03 0.25 9.73% 0.63%No MP 0.38 0.04 0.16 11.55% 0.16%
MSG3D MP 0.36 0.05 0.24 15.43% 0.00%No OP 0.40 0.06 0.27 17.72% 0.00%
SGN MP 1.28 0.09 0.38 28.24% 2.63%No MP 1.35 0.10 0.53 39.43% 0.00%
STGCN MP 0.63 0.03 n/a 29.10% n/aNo MP 0.67 0.03 n/a 31.48% n/a
MSG3D MP 0.56 0.05 n/a 27.26% n/aNo MP 0.57 0.07 n/a 28.35% n/a
SGN MP 1.51 0.18 n/a 68.45% n/aNo MP 1.54 0.19 n/a 72.09% n/a
Table 2. Targeted attack on HDM05 (top), NTU (middle) and Ki-
netics (bottom). All attacks have a 100% success rate.
100% success. The targeted attack is more challenging
than the untargeted attack [50], because the randomly se-
lected label often has completely different semantic mean-
ings from the original one. Attacking an ‘eating’ motion
to ‘drinking’ is much easier than to ‘running’. This is why
the targeted attack in general has worse results than untar-
geted attack under every metric. Even under such harsh
settings, BASAR can still produce as high as 56.98% on-
manifold adversarial samples. The performance variation
across models is consistent with the untargeted attack. Ad-
ditional details can be found in the supplementary materials.
4.5. Classifier Robustness
We notice that BASAR’s performance varies across tar-
get models consistently in both the untargeted and targeted
attack. In other words, action recognizers are not equally
gullible. SGN, in general, is the hardest to fool across all
datasets. When looking at the results, the perturbation al-
ways needs to be larger to fool SGN, shown by larger l, ∆a,
∆α and ∆B/B on every dataset compared with STGCN and
MSG3D. This includes both joint-angle and joint-position
attack. We speculate that it has to do with the features that
SGN uses. Unlike STGCN and MSG3D which use raw
joints and bones and rely on networks to learn good clas-
sification features, SGN also employs semantic features,
where different joint types are encoded in learning their pat-
terns and correlations. This type of semantic information
requires large perturbations to bring the motion out of its
pattern. Hence, semantic information improves its robust-
ness against attacks, as larger perturbations are more likely
to be perceptible. Note that SGN sometimes has a higher
OM percentage. However, we find that these OM motions
have large visual differences from the original motions. In
other words, unlike STGCN and MSG3D where a higher
OM percentage indicates more visually indistinguishable
adversarial samples, the OM samples of SGN look natu-
ral, can fool the classifier and probably can fool humans
when being observed independently, but are unlikely to sur-
vive strict side-by-side comparisons with the original mo-
tions. Next, MSG3D is slightly harder to fool than STGCN.
Although both use joint positions, MSG3D explicitly uses
the bone information, which essentially recognizes the rela-
tive movements of joints. The relative movement pattern of
joints helps resist attack by requiring the perturbation to be
large enough to break the patterns. Finally, the robustness
of a specific model varies across datasets. Meanwhile, the
pattern of robustness variations across datasets also differs
from model to model. It is hard to theoretically identify the
cause and we will leave it to future research. Additional de-
tailed findings can be found in the supplementary materials.
4.6. Perceptual Study
Numerical evaluation alone is not sufficient to evaluate
the imperceptibility of adversarial attack on skeletal mo-
tions, because they cannot accurately indicate whether the
attack is perceptible to humans [50]. We, therefore, conduct
three perceptual studies: Deceitfulness, Naturalness, Indis-
tinguishability, following [50]. Since we have 36 scenarios
(models vs datasets vs attack types vs MP/No MP), it is
unrealistic to exhaustively cover all conditions. We choose
HDM05 and untargeted attack for our perceptual studies.
We exclude NTU and Kinetics as they contain severe and
noticeable noises. Our preliminary study shows that it is
hard for people to tell if a motion is attacked therein. The
quality of HDM05 is high where perturbations can be easily
identified. In total, we recruited 50 subjects (age between
20 and 54). We briefly explain our study setting here and
refer the readers to the supplementary materials for details.
We first test whether BASAR visually changes the mean-
ing of the motion and whether the meaning of the original
motion is clear to the subjects (Deceitfulness). In each user
study, we randomly choose 45 motions (15 from STGCN,
MSG3D and SGN respectively) with the ground-truth label
and after-attack label for 45 trials. In each trial, the video is
played for 6 seconds then the user is asked to choose which
label best describes the motion with no time limits. We
also perform ablation studies to test whether on-manifold
adversarial samples look more natural than off-manifold
samples (Naturalness). In each trial, we randomly select
120 motions for 60 trials. Each trial includes one motion
attacked with manifold projection and one without. The
two motions are played side-by-side for 6 seconds twice,
then the user needs to pick which one looks more natural,
or cannot tell the difference, with no time limits. Finally,
Figure 2. Normalized user preferences on Naturalness. MP/No MP
refers to with/without manifold projection. The vertical axis is the
percentage of user preference. The horizontal axis is the attacked
models.
we conduct the strictest test to see whether the adversar-
ial samples from BASAR can survive side-by-side scrutiny
(Indistinguishability). In each trial, two motions are dis-
played side by side. The left motion is always the original
and the user is told so. The right one can be the original
motion or the attacked motion. The user is asked whether
he/she can see any visual difference after the motions are
played for 6 seconds twice.
4.6.1 Results
The average success rate of Deceitfulness is 79.64% across
three models, with 88.13% , 83.33%, 67.47% on STGCN,
MS-G3D and SGN respectively. This is consistent with our
prediction because SGN requires larger perturbations, thus
is more likely to lead to the change of the motion seman-
tics. Next, Fig. 2 shows the results of Naturalness. It is
very clear that subjects regard on-manifold samples as more
natural. This is understandable as manifold projection not
only makes sure the poses are on the manifold, but also en-
forces the similarity of the dynamics between the attacked
and original motion. Finally, the results of Indistinguisha-
bility are 89.90% on average. BASAR even outperforms
the white-box attack (80.83%) in [50]. We further look into
on-manifold vs off-manifold. Both samples are tested in In-
distinguishability, but 94.63% of the on-manifold samples
fooled the users; while 84.69% of the off-manifold sam-
ples fooled the users, showing that on-manifold samples are
more deceitful. The off-manifold samples which success-
fully fool the users contain only very small deviations.
4.7. Comparison
Since BASAR is the very first black-box adversarial at-
tack method on skeletal motions, there is no baseline for
comparison. We therefore employ several methods that are
closet to our approach. The first is SMART [50] which
also attacks skeletal motions but is a white-box approach.
Although it can deliver a black-box attack, it needs a sur-
rogate model. According to their work, we choose HRNN
[15] and 2SAGCN [40] as the surrogate models. The second
baseline method is MTS [20] which is a black-box method
but only on general multivariate time-series. It is the most
similar method to BASAR but does not model the data man-
ifold. Another baseline method is BA [3] which attacks im-
age data. Since it is also a black-box approach and focuses
on the boundary attack, we also include it in the compar-
ison. We choose HDM05 and NTU for comparisons. For
each comparison, we randomly select 1200 and 490 mo-
tions from NTU and HDM05. Since MTS is not designed
for untargeted attack, we only compare BASAR with it on
the targeted attack.
Tab. 3 lists the success rates of all methods. BASAR
performs the best and often by big margins. In the targeted
attack, the highest among the baseline methods is merely
30.31% which is achieved by SMART on HDM05/MSG3D.
BASAR achieves 100%. In the untargeted attack, the base-
line methods achieve higher performances but still worse
than BASAR. SMART achieves as high as 99.33% on
NTU/MSG3D. However, its performance is not reliable as
it highly depends on the chosen surrogate model, which is
consistent with [50]. In addition, we further look into the re-
sults and find that SMART’s results are inconsistent. When
the attack is transferred, the result labels are often different
from the labels obtained during the attack.
We find that BA can also achieve 100% success. How-
ever, BA is designed to attack image data and does not con-
sider the data manifold. We therefore compare detailed met-
rics and show the results in Tab. 4. BA is in general worse
than BASAR under every metric. The worst is the bone-
length constraint violation. Visually, the skeletal structure
cannot be observed at all. This happens for both the untar-
geted and the targeted attack across all datasets and mod-
els. This is understandable because BA’s assumption is
that perturbations in all directions have the same effect,
while BASAR assumes that in-manifold perturbations pro-
vide better visual quality.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
To systematically investigate the vulnerability of state-
of-the-art action recognizers, we proposed the very first
black-box adversarial attack method which gives strong per-
formance across datasets, models and attack modes. Quan-
titative evaluations demonstrate the high quality of the at-
tack. Harsh perceptual studies show the imperceptibility
of BASAR. Through comprehensive comparisons, BASAR
outperforms existing methods by large margins in the suc-
cess rate and quality. More broadly, we show, for the first
time, the wide existence of on-manifold adversarial sam-
ples in skeletal motions. Based on the attack, we discuss
what classifiers or features tend to be robust against attack.
BASAR raises a serious yet unaddressed security concern
that we expect will inform the future research. In future, we
will investigate the perceptually-guided adversarial attack.
We found that imperceptible perturbations form a small
subspace. The interplay among the classification boundary,





























Table 3. Attack success rate comparison with baseline methods.
Models l↑ ∆a↑ ∆α ↑ ∆B/B↑ OM↓
STGCN UA 1.44 0.65 4.74 10.60% 0.00%TA 8.83 0.17 1.60 8.56% 0.00%
MSG3D UA 1.17 0.36 2.81 6.00% 0.00%TA 7.93 0.10 1.07 7.49% 0.00%
SGN UA 13.35 3.45 21.96 75.11% 0.00%TA 15.40 1.52 11.77 29.45% 0.00%
STGCN UA 1.04 0.47 1.97 235.10% 0.00%TA 0.41 0.08 0.37 35.00% 0.00%
MSG3D UA 1.24 1.73 2.38 911.7% 0.00%TA 0.27 0.07 0.34 25.72% 0.00%
SGN UA 0.22 0.28 1.26 125.57% 3.60%TA 0.42 0.15 0.66 65.31% 0.17%
Table 4. Boundary Attack (BA) on HDM05 (top), NTU (bottom).
UA/TA refers Untargeted/Targeted Attack.
the data manifold and the imperceptible subspace is likely
to lead to adversarial samples with higher quality. The inter-
play is also likely to shed light on effective defense strate-
gies against imperceptible attack.
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